



**SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR THE ECONOMIC
AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE AND ITS CITIZENS:
POST-COMMUNIST CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

**DELIVERABLE 2
DESK RESEARCH**

BULGARIA

Scientific consultant: Todor Hristov

CONTENTS

Introduction	p.2
Section 1. “Objective” indicators of social inequality	p.2
1.1. 1878-1944	
1.2. 1944-1989	
1.3. After 1989	
1.4. 1998-2004	
1.5. The post-Communist period. General conclusions	
Section 2. Causes and correlates of social inequality	p.28
Section 3. Social inequality and national political culture	p.35
Section 4. Social inequality and the national party system	p.39
Section 5. Mechanisms for amelioration of social inequality	p.42
Section 6. Main problems with existing knowledge	p.47
Conclusions	p.48
Selected bibliography	p.49

INTRODUCTION

The data led us to conclude that Bulgarian social stratification is to a significant extent determined by historical processes exceeding the post-Cold-War or Cold-War period: wide access to cultural capital unrelated to social status, democratic political attitudes, tightly interlaced economic and political capital, and small elite trying to maintain its status through the vicissitudes of history. The desk research also showed that the study should apply cautiously several common predictors to the Bulgarian situation (social class, gender, education).

SECTION 1. “OBJECTIVE” INDICATORS OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY

We have divided the historical account into 4 main periods: from the reestablishment of Bulgarian state in 1878 to the advent of communism in 1944, then from 1944 to the end of communism in 1989, from 1989 to the 1997 economic crisis, and from 1997 to the present.

1.1. 1878-1944

Understanding historical background of communist government in Bulgaria is particularly important since communist regime tried to deal with social stratification problems inherited from the interwar period, as well as to measure its achievements against that period.

The Bulgarian state was reestablished in 1878. The Bulgarian economy before liberation was deeply entangled in the Ottoman economy. Its main products were agricultural and craft goods sold on the vast Ottoman market, from Istanbul to Egypt and Iraq.

The Liberation triggered several important processes bearing on social stratification:

1. It closed the access of the Bulgarian craft industries to the Ottoman market setting off the decline of the economically most active and prosperous stratum of the Bulgarian society – the craftsmen from the small towns around the Balkan mountain.

2. The Liberation initiated extensive land redistribution. In the Ottoman period Muslim *bey*, Muslim Foundations, the Sultan owned large land estates that were split after the Liberation into considerably smaller portions, and bought, seized, or rented by Bulgarian peasants. The land redistribution was further stimulated by the state, which gave out a

considerable amount of bey or common land to landless peasants. The redistribution in effect minimized peasant poverty, and pressed forward a process already in place in the late Ottoman period – the fragmentation of land into small ownerships, sufficient to feed a family but grossly inadequate to any kind of modern agricultural industry.

Table 1: Arable Land Distribution before Communism [Berov 1974: 122]

Types of Estates	Land Estates		
	1926	1934	1946
Small (< 100 da.)	58.1%	66.9%	76.8%
Medium (100-500 da.)	39.9%	31.5%	22.5%
Large (> 500 da.)	2%	1.6%	0.7%
All	100%	100%	100%


3. The establishment of the Bulgarian state triggered the formation of a social stratum of state officials, often identified with the intelligentsia (though it could be more properly called bureaucracy). In fact, in the early 1880-ties, virtually any gymnasium-educated Bulgarian was offered an office providing an excellent income and splendid career perspectives (there were only 2121 state officials in 1878, 20509 – almost 10 times more – in 1896, and 51137 – 24 times more – in 1911).

4. The establishment of Bulgarian state produced a political elite, which, because of the democratic arrangements of the political process, came from fairly different social or educational backgrounds (the Bulgarian constitution was more intensely democratic than the British constitution at the time).

The mentioned processes defined the following features of the post-liberation Bulgarian society: widely and not grossly unevenly distributed – in fact dispersed – economic capital; extensive social mobility stimulated by the easy access to educational and – to an extent – political capital; lack of any significant dependence between the distribution of economic, political and educational capital.

At the turn of the century the Bulgarian society was largely a peasant society:

Chart 1: Rural Population 1878-1944 [Totev 1974: 147-150]



The most sizeable minority were the Turks, concentrated in the northeast, in the districts of Razgrad, Shumen, Varna, Russe and in the eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains.

Table 2: Ethnic groups 1878-1944 [Totev 1974: 152-3]

Year	Year	
	1880	1934
Ethnicity		
Bulgarians	68.8%	83.8%
Turks	23.1%	9.7%
Roma	1.6%	2.8%
Greek	2.22%	0.18%
Romanian	1.73%	1.23%
Other	2.55%	2.29%

The population was distributed among the professional categories in the following way:

Table 3: Professional stratification 1878-1944 [Daskalov 2005 2: 226-8]

Professional category	Year	
	1905	1934
Agriculture	82.55%	82.3%
Industry	1.4%	2.6%
Crafts	5.6%	2.5%
Trade and banking	2.91%	1.4%
Government	2.32%	2%
Self-employed	1.4%	0.5%
Transport and communications	0.98%	0.8%
Other	2.84%	8.9%

The first decade of 20th c. was a period of prosperity, to an extent due to the rise of the international corn prices (corn was the most important product of the Bulgarian economy). Yet it was also a period of financial crises caused by the enormous amount of debt the Bulgarian government incurred trying to modernize the infrastructure and the army.

The Balkan wars and the WWI caused a massive loss of life (188 700 dead), destabilized the economy, and eventuated in occupation and unbearable war reparations. The end of war triggered a massive immigration of Bulgarians from the territories annexed to Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Romania (698 000 immigrants, about 15% of the population; in fact the immigration started even earlier, after the 1904 Ilinden rebellion, generating a mass of landless and virtually homeless population relying almost exclusively on the state).

The years after the WWI were marked by the influence of the worldwide economic crisis, which Bulgaria survived relatively unharmed due to the agricultural nature of the Bulgarian economy.

The professional distribution remained relatively stable until 1944 save a relatively small increase in the number of industry workers (29 100 in 1905, 151 600

in 1935, 232 800 in 1939). The studies of the social stratification of the period have also demonstrated a qualified stability of the income groups:

Table 4: Income Stratification 1924-1939 [Daskalov 2005 2: 226-8]

Professional group	Average annual income, lv. 1924-1939
Agriculture	6000-13000
Industry workers	12000-19000
Industry managers	41000-58000
Government officials	30000-36000
Self-employed	28000-50000

The Bulgarian health care system was a complicated mix of state or privately funded health services, generally considered expensive to the peasants and the workers, who were therefore particularly exposed to typhus and tuberculosis epidemics (in 1910-1911 for example the municipal authorities of Sofia registered 374 of tuberculosis 44% of which were workers, 27% students and teachers, 16% housewives, 10% government officials, 3% salesmen).

Table 5: Health care indicators 1878-1944

	1923	1934	1939
Physicians per 1000 people	0.19	0.43	0.47
Hospital beds per 1000 people	–	1.1	1.5

The most essential social conflict in the Bulgarian society was not the one between the working class and the bourgeoisie, as the later Marxist analyses suggested, but rather the one between the peasants and the political and economic elite concentrated in the several big cities.

An influential study from the 1990-ties explained this conflict in terms of modernization: Bulgarian society left the Ottoman realm as a traditional rather than modern society; nevertheless modernization was an imperative and the only agent capable of carrying it out was the state; the state policies met however the unyielding

resistance of the peasants, who did not understand the need for modernization and detested the heavy taxation steadily ruining them into poverty. [Dimitrov 1995]

Yet one can easily imagine another explanation:

- paying debts (incurred by the state in building the infrastructure and the army) required resources government did not have, hence it tried to get more resources by making more debts, and ultimately by taxation; the tax burden though fell mainly on the small land owners;
- the Bulgarian elite had virtually not existed before 1878 and so it was created by the state;
- since government accumulated economic capital incomparable to any private capital in the country, it provided the best opportunities for enriching oneself, and in effect, the economic elite had in one way or another benefited from the state;
- the state therefore emerged as a mechanism for redistribution of economic capital, or else, as a mechanism for transformation of political into economic capital;
- at the same time educational capital was widely distributed, so it enabled the social actors to make political claims, which the authorities felt unable to consider, thus stirring a widespread discontent.

No matter what explanation one would prefer, the conflict between the peasants and the elite lead to 3 revolts, crushed by the authorities, as well as to the advent of a powerful agrarian party, the Bulgarian Agrarian Popular Union, which governed the country between 1918 and 1923, when after a military coup it was crushed by the army and ultimately banned.

1.2. 1944-1989


The advent of socialism initiated a far-reaching redistribution of resources:

1. The Bulgarian Communist Party, in coalition with the Bulgarian Agrarian Popular Union, expropriated the economic and political capital from the old elites.
2. Private land ownership was dampened and by 1950 virtually annihilated. Peasants were invited, in fact often forced, to enter the local cooperative farms.

3. Socialist government launched an extensive modernization program that involved building infrastructure and heavy industry, as well as rebuilding the health and education systems in line with the Soviet pattern.

As a consequence, the percentage of the peasant population decreased, as migrating to the cities offered far more attractive career prospects and, in effect, better life chances (hence, in view of the fact that the younger men and women were particularly prone to migration, the demography of the Bulgarian village changed dramatically).

Chart 2: Rural Population 1944-1989 [Statisticheski spravochnik 1997: 5]



The official notion described the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia as the principal social groups composing the socialist society. Therefore the official statistics differentiated three professional groups:

Table 6: Social stratification 1944-1989, official account [Demografiska 1988: 11]

Social groups	1960			1975			1985		
	total %	male %	female %	total %	male %	female %	total %	male %	female %
Workers	41	46	34.9	65.2	68.4	61.5	68.5	73.3	63.4
Peasants	38.7	32.9	46.2	6.7 ¹	5.7	7.9	–	–	–
Officials and Intelligentsia	16.2	16.9	15.3	26.2	24.3	28.5	29.7	25.4	34.3
Others	4	4.2	3.6	1.9	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.3	2.3

More sophisticated sociological accounts of the professional stratification outlined the following general picture:

Table 7: Social stratification 1944-1989, 1986 ‘City and village’ survey [Tilkidziev 1988: 118-9]

Social Categories	Social Groups	%
1. Workers	1.1. Low-qualification workers	58.38
	1.2. Medium-qualification workers	16.14
	1.3. Highly-qualification workers	31.03
		3.21
2. Agricultural and forestry workers	2.1. Low-qualification agricultural and forestry workers	23.28
	2.2. Qualified agricultural workers	19.27
		4.04
3. Officials	3.1. Low-qualification officials	17.88
	3.2. Qualified officials	3.47
		14.41
4. Intelligentsia		7.51
5. Private businessmen		0.61
6. Others (self-employed and unspecified)		0.34

That picture remained relatively stable between the early 1970-ties and the late 1980-ties. The income of the different professions was leveled to a significant extent, so it did not play any significant role in social stratification:

¹ The peasants working in state farms were considered workers rather than cooperative peasants.

Table 8: Average income 1980-1989 [Statisticheski godishnik 1992: 8, 54]

Economy Sector	1980	1985	1987	1988	1989
All	2185	2464	2812	3025	3292
Industry	2288	2724	3031	3256	3475
Agriculture	1970	2286	2513	2815	3232
Construction	2516	2827	3172	3352	3670
Forestry	1808	2077	2426	2598	2833
Communications	1968	2369	2588	2739	3039
Transport	2494	2871	3083	3261	3580
Trade	1949	2188	2360	2572	2788
Science and research	2433	3013	3302	3535	3720
Education	2075	2396	2590	2650	2770
Culture and arts	2081	2348	2480	2646	2944
Health and social care, sport	2001	2387	2519	2595	2702
Finances, credit, insurance	1996	2513	2720	2949	3219
Government	2569	2984	3143	3384	3550

Social inequalities in communist Bulgaria were shaped by the unequal distribution of social and political before economic or educational capital. An influential theory of the late 1990-ties tried to explain the interaction between the different types of capital by the existence of second order networks of exchange, governed by the logic of the gift rather than the market, interwoven with the official exchange networks. [Raichev 2001]

The social inequalities in communist Bulgaria were shaped by the differential access to resources considered to be property of the people but in reality enjoyed by the government or, in other words, by the party elite. There was a famous story about the former head of state Todor Zhivkov, secretary general of the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1956: being investigated for corruption after the falling from office, he declared that he owned virtually nothing. So it proved to be, and after long

and futile investigations the prosecutor asked him: “How come you had not got a car?” Zhivkov said: “Well, I did not need any, I had a driver 24 hours at my disposal.”

Another currently influential theory claimed that communist government in Bulgaria produced a sizeable middle class defined by the so-called “three keys” (i.e. the keys to an apartment, a car, and a villa, the essential property owned by the successful members of the communist society that were excluded from the party elite). [Raichev 2001] Not surprisingly, the theory also claimed that this middle class was ruined by the fall of communism. [Mitev 2001]

Another important effect of communist government was the development of an education system that almost eliminated illiteracy, even among the ethnic minorities:

Table 9: Education Profile, 1980s

		1985	1990
Gross enrollment ratio (%)	Primary level	102.3	97.6
	Secondary level	101.7	75.2
	Tertiary level	18.9	31.7
Student flow – primary level	Primary completion rate (%)	–	101.9
	Pupils reaching grade 5 (% of the cohort)	96.3	90.6
	Repetition rate (%)	1.8	4.4
Student flow – secondary level	Progression to secondary level (%)	53	63
	Repetition rate (%)	0.3	0.5
Total spending on education as % of GDP		5.5	5.2
Ratio of pupils to teachers at primary level		17.7	15.4
Gender parity index		1.0	1.0

The modernization of health care system nearly eliminated the tuberculosis and typhus epidemics, and made an attempt at incorporating the villages into health service networks. Another important achievement of communism was the (officially declared) reduction of the unemployment to 0.7%.

1.3. After 1989

The fall of socialism initiated another thorough redistribution of the economic and political capital:

1. 87% of the value of the state assets has been privatized between 1993 and 2004, with only 162 foreign buyers out of total 5174; privatization has in effect produced new economic elite (there is a theory that it was in fact the same old elite).

2. Since privatization was state administered, it required not merely economic capital but also, or perhaps even more, political and social capital, so the political and economic elites turned out tightly interlaced.

3. Since the early 1990-ties Bulgaria entered economic crisis, with 25.6% fall of the GDP, 54% fall of the export, 62.1% increase of the domestic prices, 62.4% decrease of national savings between 1985 and 1995, in conjunction with 65.6% fall of the actual income and 47.8% of the middle income levels (after the 1996 bank crisis and subsequent hyperinflation, in the early 1997 a normal monthly salary amounted to 5-9\$).

4. Since the socialist industry relied on the low-priced Soviet energy and raw material supplies, as well as on the Soviet market, which was lost after 1989, it collapsed in the middle 1990-ties, causing unprecedented unemployment (industry GDP share fell from 62.8% in 1985 to 32.7% in 1995). The unemployment rose from 0.7% in 1985 to 16.4% in 1993 and 15.3% in 1996. Particularly vulnerable to unemployment were the semi-skilled workers (27.5% of the total unemployment) and the unskilled workers (54.8% of the total unemployment). The unemployment was especially severe in the rural and small town areas where in 1996 the officially declared unemployment reached 21.2%. 57% of the unemployment was caused by reductions of staff.

5. Agricultural land was restituted to the former owners disseminating into even smaller ownerships (the communist authorities nationalized the land of almost 1.5 million owners, but the post-communist authorities had to retribute the same land to more than 4 million owners). The bulk of the land owners entered local cooperatives that, lacking the means for production, turned out to be uncompetitive and economically inefficient (the GDP share of agricultural production fell from 11.9% in 1985 to 9.3 in 2005). The share of the employed in agricultural sector however increased from 9.7% in 1992 to 19.9% in 1996, and the share of the “home-made” agricultural goods in the total household income oscillated between 19.3% in 1992 and 20.1% in 1996.

6. Poverty and unemployment set off extensive emigration (2.7% of the total population left the country permanently between 1993 and 2001; there is no official statistics on temporary emigration).

7. The process of emigration caused significant decrease of the economically active population (it fell to almost 60% in 1999; the proportion of the employed shrunk from 51.7% in 1985 to 38.6% from the total population in 1992).

8. The abolition of the state restraints on mobility let loose an extensive process of internal migration to the cities (64.8% urban population in 1985, 67.1% in 1992, 70% in 2005).

9. Liberalization initiated the formation of a private sector employing increasingly larger portions of the labor force (5.9% of the total labor force in 1989, 28.3% in 1993, and 42% in 1996). This in turn reshaped significantly the professional environment (in 2002, less than 25% of the employed kept the positions they had before 1989).

The collapse of socialism reshaped the professional stratification in the following way:

Table 10: Social stratification, 1997 ‘The New Stratification in the Bulgarian Village’ survey [Tilkidzhiev 1988: 67-9]

A. Employed (incl. employed pensioners)		
1.	High level state officials (incl. central government, mayors, directors of state owned firms, banks, army and police officers)	0.9%
2.	Intelligentsia	8.1%
3.	Employees of state and private firms and agencies (-1, 2)	12.4%
4.	Big private businessmen (more than 50 employees)	0.2%
5.	Middle level private businessmen (10 to 49 employees)	1.1%
6.	Small private businessmen (0 to 9 employees)	2.3%
7.	Private agricultural dealers and producers (0 to 9 employees)	0.5%
8.	Farmers	3.6%
9.	Skilled workers and technicians	14%
10,	Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	9.8%
11.	Others	1.1%
B. Unemployed		
12.	Pensioners	28.9%
13.	Unemployed	10.8%
14.	Students	2.8%
15.	Housewives	1.7%
16.	Physically disadvantaged	0.6%
17.	Soldiers (temporarily drafted)	0.3%
18.	Others	0.7%

The relatively stable income from the communist period developed into a far more differentiated picture:

Table 11: Average income 1980-1989 [Statisticheski godishnik 1992: 8, 54]

Economy Sector	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
All	3292	4329	11508	24568	38776	5925	9166	167582
Industry	3475	4199	11570	26931	41775	64273	101371	207188
Agriculture	3232	4857	11269	18701	27477	41543	64069	112961
Construction	3670	4758	13427	28150	42049	66394	94028	168078
Forestry	2833	3443	9249	18203	28395	41176	63998	100719
Communications	3039	4146	12060	25893	41834	66119	96027	173936
Transport	3580	4670	12577	28446	46609	72594	109339	208214
Trade	2788	3749	10341	24176	38015	58628	93924	174730
Science and research	3720	4614	11699	24400	38399	60344	91147	139236
Education	2770	3858	10508	20054	31599	46012	67833	108587
Culture and arts	2944	3750	10115	19166	30167	44936	72052	105220
Health and social care, sport	2702	4207	10625	21087	33720	48637	70363	107503
Finances, credit, insurance	3219	4614	16124	39291	75999	112849	171205	293528
Government	3550	4777	12808	26330	45024	67824	98457	137178

The income data could be more adequate if supplemented with data on the decrease of real purchase power and consumption stratification:

Table 12: Household Expenditure Structure 1990-1996

Expenditure groups	1965	1975	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Food	43.6	38.8	39.5	36.3	43.4	45.0	48.2
Liqueur	4.5	3.0	3.4	3.3	2.3	2.0	1.8
Tobacco	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.9	2.4	2.1
Clothing and footwear	13.0	11.3	9.9	11.9	8.3	7.4	6.5
Energy	8.7	7.5	7.4	7.3	4.3	4.3	6.7
Furniture	3.6	5.2	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.6	3.5
Education and recreation	4.8	4.3	3.5	4.6	3.5	3.0	2.5
Health	1.2	1.8	2.3	2.0	1.9	3.2	3.6
Transport and communications	2.6	6.9	7.2	8.0	7.7	8.0	7.6

In view of the decreasing standard of living, the bulk of Bulgarians tended to describe the post-communist condition in terms of winners and losers:

Table 13: Which groups benefited from the changes (open question) [Dimitrova 2002]

Politicians	55.3%
Mafia, criminals	36.8%
Businessmen, salesmen	18.3%
Restitution beneficiaries	6.7%
Former party leaders	5.2%
Rich	5.0%
Custom officials	4.9%
Inventive, able to take risks	3.7%
Bankers and insurance managers	3.6%
Physicians	3.3%
Judges, prosecutors, lawyers	2.7%
Corrupted	2.6%
Credit millionaires	2.5%
Aggressive, unprincipled, flexible	2.4%
Industry managers	1.7%
Government officials' families, relatives, friends	1.3%
Communists	1.3%
Sly, adaptable	1.0%

Table 14: To which groups the changes have been detrimental (open question)

The people, the general public	36.8%
Workers	21.3%
Pensioners	20.3%
Peasants	9.2%
The poor	7.6%
Unemployed	7.0%
Middle class	6.5%
Farmers	4.6%
Young people, students	4.3%
Employed	4.0%
Educated, intellectuals	3.4%
Roma	2.4%
Children	1.8%
Uneducated	1.7%
Central and local government officials	1.7%
Businessmen, salesmen	1.5%
The diligent	1.3%
Physicians	1.1%

The Bulgarians seem inclined to identify themselves with the losers even if they have achieved successful upward mobility:

Table 15: Which groups benefited most from the recent changes? [Dimitrova 2002]

	Total	Respondents better off according to the objective indicators	Respondents defining themselves as winners
Politicians	55%	49%	41%
Mafia, criminals	37%	35%	27%
Businessmen, salesmen	18%	20%	19%
Restitution beneficiaries	7%	5%	23%
Former party leaders	5%	7%	9%
Inventive, able to take risks	4%	6%	50%
Sly, adaptable	2%	3%	9%
Corrupted	3%	3%	5%
Government officials' families, relatives, friends	1%	2%	5%

Hence the accounts of the post-communist transformation have been unswervingly pessimistic:

Table 16: In what direction developed Bulgaria: [Dimitrova 2002]

	Better	Worse	Don't know
Before 1944	19%	11%	70%
Between 1944-1989	71%	11%	18%
1994-1996	8%	74%	18%
1997-2001	21%	67%	13%
After 2001	18%	53%	29%

Table 17: Which opinion about the development of the country in the last 12 years do you endorse? [Dimitrova 2002]

Situation developed in the worst possible way	40%
It could have been worse	39%
Despite all the difficulties the situation developed in a relatively positive way; we should not expect anything different	17%
No answer	4%

The social surveys from the early 2000-ties generally claimed that the percentage of the general public believing that the economic situation is deteriorating (80%) was manifestly higher than the percentage of the respondents declaring that their own situation is deteriorating (60%). What was more, notwithstanding the fact that 19-22% of the respondents had experienced upward mobility after 1989 only 5% identified themselves as “winners”.

The sociologists tried to account for that phenomenon, often called social pessimism, by differentiating three social groups defined by their attitude about the post-communist condition:

- Individuals whose economic situation has been significantly deteriorated – pensioners, unskilled workers, uneducated (about 60%); workers and officials which qualifications and skills have become obsolete after the end of communism. The members of this group fight for their survival; they are unable to develop stable political allegiance and are particularly vulnerable to populism.
 - Individuals who benefited in the early stages of the transition thanks to personal connections with the former party elite (about 5%). This group allegedly resists the market economy and the transformation itself.
 - Individuals able to adapt to the new situation, having the necessary qualifications, skills and personality to succeed in a market economy.
- [Dimitrova 2002: 31-2]

The ideological underpinnings of that classification though are still open to debate. In fact, the same surveys proved the Bulgarians to be quite supportive of democracy:

Table 18: Current government system is not the only one we have had. Some people claim that we need another system of government. What do you think? Would you indicate your opinion about the following statements? [Dimitrova 2002]

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Don't know
We should turn back to communist government	11%	19%	9%	47%	14%
We should have a strong leader rather than parliament	21%	23%	10%	23%	23%
We should turn back to monarchy	3%	6%	6%	64%	23%
We should have experts rather than the government make most important decisions	32%	29%	6%	8%	25%
Multiparty system causes chaos, we should turn back to one-party system	15%	14%	12%	34%	25%
In particular circumstances the best form of government is dictatorship	10%	21%	8%	39%	22%
Bulgaria should be governed as it currently is	5%	16%	17%	44%	18%

The health and social security systems reforms started in 1998. The share of central government expenditure allocated to health remained relatively stable (12% average

rate in 1994-2000). The level of medical services also remained relatively stable though often blamed for its deteriorating quality (the physicians per 1000 persons ratio oscillated between 3.4 in 2000 and 4.3 in 1995). The rate of drug or alcohol addicts was insignificant (0.13 drug and 3.19 alcohol addicts per 1000 persons in 1996; AIDS statistic was virtually lacking). The life expectancy and morbidity rates also did not undergo significant changes (9 deaths per 1000 persons in 1970, 12 in 1990, 14 in 2005; 71 years average life expectancy in 1970, 71 in 1990, 73 in 1995). The most significant change in the period was the emergence of a negative annual population growth rate (0.1% in 1970-1990, -0.8% in 1990-2005).

1.4 1998-2006

After the 1996 crisis Bulgarian economy took the path of recovery:

Table 19: Macroeconomic indicators, 1997-2005

	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
GDP (EUR, millions)	7 991	11 368	13 679	16 533	19 434
GDP per capita (EUR)	956	1 377	1 674	2 101	2 498
GDP growth (%)	-9.4	4.0	5.4	4.9	5.6
Employment growth (in relation to previous year, %)	–	-0.2	-3.5	0.4	2.2
Agriculture, share in added value growth (%)	15.1	18.8	13.9	12.1	10.9
Industry (without construction), share in added value growth (%)	26.5	25.7	25.5	24.6	25.2
Construction, share in added value growth (%)	4.2	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.8
Services, share in added value growth (%)	54.2	50.7	56.0	58.8	59.1
End consumption GDP share, current year prices (%)	86.5	82.9	87.1	86.8	86.9
Inflation (% in relation to previous year)	–	18.7	10.3	5.8	6.1

The proportions of unemployment and economically active population remained relatively stable, displaying a slight trend towards decrease:

Table 20: Employment indicators, 1997-2006

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Economically active population (% of the total population)	49.2	47.5	48.1	48.4	49.2	49.7	51.1	52.7
Man (%)	54.5	52.4	52.4	53.2	54.5	55.3	57.0	57.9
Women (%)	44.2	42.9	44.0	43.9	44.2	44.6	45.7	48.0
Employed (%)	40.8	39.7	38.7	40.3	42.4	43.7	46.4	48.1
Man (%)	45.1	43.7	41.8	43.9	46.8	48.4	51.8	53.1
Women (%)	36.8	36.0	35.8	37.0	38.4	39.5	41.5	43.4
Unemployed (%)	17.0	16.4	19.5	16.8	13.7	12.0	9.2	8.8
Man (%)	17.3	16.5	20.4	17.6	14.1	12.5	9.2	8.3
Women (%)	16.8	16.2	18.5	15.8	13.2	11.5	9.1	9.4
Young (< 24 years)	36.7	–	–	–	86.4	79.2	20.5	19.4
Long-term unemployed share of the total unemployment (%)	–	59.7	63.2	65.8	65.4	59.3	61.7	56.4

The professional stratification has also remained relatively stable. The ratio of private sector employment displayed a discernible movement towards increase, although it offered to the employee approximately lower income (in 2004, the average private sector salary was 66% of the average public sector salary, in the face of 36.5% lower cost of one working hour to the employer).

The incomes stabilized and started to grow to an extent, being however unable to outstrip the inflation.

Table 21: Professional stratification, 1997-2006 (number of employees, thousands)

Economic activities	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector
Total	1900	779	1120	1928	730	1198	2080	763.4	1317	2152	729	1423
Agriculture, forestry	79.5	11.0	68.4	78.5	9.2	69.4	74.9	11.7	63.2	72.0	11.6	60.4
Mining	36.9	22.6	14.3	33.8	18.0	15.7	32.8	17.4	15.3	30.7	15.1	15.6
Manufacturing industry	562.3	51.0	511.2	573.9	36.0	537.9	597.9	32.0	565.9	606.8	24.7	582.1
Energy	59.2	55.6	3.6	59.1	54.6	4.5	58.8	53.7	5.0	58.3	52.0	6.3
Construction	97.1	22.3	74.8	95.3	16.8	78.6	108.1	14.6	93.6	119.6	10.9	108.7
Trade	222.7	6.9	215.9	239.0	3.1	235.9	282.5	2.6	279.9	301.6	2.1	299.5
Hotels and restaurants	55.7	6.9	48.8	58.1	6.1	52.1	75.0	6.3	68.7	79.5	5.0	74.3
Transport, communications	163.4	109.7	53.7	161.2	104.8	57.3	159.7	98.9	60.7	163.0	73.8	89.2
Finances	27.5	11.5	15.9	27.7	6.8	20.8	29.1	5.8	23.3	30.9	1.7	29.1
Real estates	100.6	31.5	68.5	105.1	30.8	74.4	113.7	30.0	83.7	124.6	29.9	94.7
Government	95.8	95.8	–	96.9	96.9	–	111.7	111.7	–	118.7	118.7	–
Education	202.4	198.2	4.2	191.2	194.0	4.2	193.9	189.5	4.4	193.5	188.9	4.6
Health and social services	133.5	121.0	11.5	132.1	117.7	14.4	132.4	116.5	16.0	133.7	116.4	17.3
Other	64.0	34.9	29.7	67.8	34.8	32.9	109.3	72.5	36.8	119.4	77.9	41.5

Table 22: Income stratification, 1997-2006 (average annual salary, lv.)

Economic activities	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector	Total	Public sector	Private sector
Total	2880	3491	2452	3091	3871	2613	3280	4118	2790	3509	4400	3049
Agriculture, forestry	2223	2594	2162	2302	2918	2220	2424	3009	2315	2589	3189	2473
Mining	4671	4826	4430	5002	5431	4508	5167	5740	4513	5837	6331	5355
Manufacturing industry	2722	3933	2600	2836	4235	2741	2951	4526	2861	3145	4955	3067
Energy	5329	5371	4696	5572	5608	5135	6137	6156	5932	6487	6504	6347
Construction	2551	3181	2362	2579	3334	2417	2788	3552	2669	2941	3865	2848
Trade	2009	4449	1930	2163	4429	2133	2413	5343	2385	2609	5698	2588
Hotels and restaurants	1801	2540	1696	1856	2839	1741	1948	2983	1853	2064	3325	1975
Transport, communications	3523	4017	2505	3715	4233	2761	4108	4631	3245	4255	4747	3845
Finances	6118	5885	6287	6641	6941	6542	7508	7361	7544	8165	10510	8026
Real estates	2741	3215	2519	2880	3454	2641	2985	3541	2785	3255	3829	3073
Government	4032	4032	–	4734	4734	–	5182	5182	–	5644	5644	–
Education	2783	2764	3565	3228	3209	4118	3567	3544	4550	3858	3832	4907
Health and social services	2613	2711	1599	3059	3209	1853	3567	3766	2131	3961	4213	2280
Other	2506	2527	2481	2721	2746	2694	2324	2080	2812	2471	2250	2890

An influential 2002 study described the resulting social stratification as follows:

Table 23: Social structure 1997-2006 [Dimitrova 2002]

Employed	49%
Managers (owners, partners)	6%
Managers (non-owners)	4%
Skilled workers	23%
Unskilled workers	15%
Self-employed	1%
Unemployed	51%
Students	2%
Housewives	1%
Physically disadvantaged	2%
Unemployed	18%
Pensioners	27%

Table 24. Social stratification of the adult population in Bulgaria, % [Tilkidzhiev 2002: 361]

	07.1997	08.1999	09.1999	08.2001	06.2002
High-level state officials / administrator / managers	0.9	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.8
Professionals, non-top administrators and managers, experts	8.1	8.7	6.4	8.0	6.8
Routine non-manual employees	12.4	12.1	11.2	9.2	7.7
Small and medium size entrepreneurs and self-employed farmers	7.4	5.2	7.9	4.2	3.8
Skilled manual workers and technicians and supervisors	14.0	13.5	12.2	12.5	10.6
Semi-skilled and non-skilled manual workers, incl. agricultural	9.8	8.3	6.7	6.6	4.7
Pensioners	28.9	29.8	33.6	34.3	38.0
Unemployed	10.8	15.0	51.5	17.8	22.6
students	2.8	2.7	4.0	4.3	2.3
Other, incl. housewives	4.6	3.4	1.5	4.5	2.5
NA	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 25: Poverty indicators 1997-2006. Have you been unable to afford: (%) [Dimitrova 2002]

	Often	Occasionally	Never	No answer
Food	20	32	47	1
Heating	24	29	46	1
Clothing	50	32	17	1
Medicines	24	33	41	2
Home improvements or appliances	60	27	12	2
Education	25	15	41	19
Travel	63	22	12	3

Table 26: Average monthly income per household member (% of total population, 2002):

< 50 lv.	24
50-100 lv.	42
100-150 lv.	17
150-200 lv.	9
200-300 lv.	5
> 300 lv.	2

The study differentiated four major social groups:

- Bottom: 25% of the population; incomes < 50 or 50-100 lv. monthly income per household member; main sources of income – pensions, welfare and unemployment payments, domestic agricultural products; often unable to afford food or heating; lacking home appliances besides cooker and refrigerator, usually old; pensioners, unemployed, ethnic minorities; concentrated in the rural areas.
- Lower middle: 55% of the population; 50-100 lv. monthly income per household member; main source of income – salary or pension; occasionally unable to afford food, heating, medicines, home improvements, travel; working, but old home appliances; no PC, stereo or cell phone; old cars.
- Upper middle: 15% of the population; > 100 lv. monthly income per household member; main sources of income – salary, business revenues; occasionally unable to afford clothing; new home appliances; cell phones, computers; concentrated in the big cities; high living standard.
- Upper: 5% of the population; > 150 lv. monthly income per household member; main sources of income – salary and business revenues; occasionally

unable to afford traveling and home improvements; less new home appliances than the upper middle group.

The level of inequality has been comparable to the other post-communist countries:

Table 27: Level of inequality 2006

	Bulgaria	Romania	Hungary	United Kingdom
GINI index	29.2	26.9	28.8	36.8
Household income by percentage share, lowest 10%	3.4%	2.4%	4.1%	2.1%
Household income by percentage share, highest 10%	23.9%	27.6%	22.2%	28.5%
Population below poverty line	4%	25%	8.6%	17%


Table 28. General inequality indicators 1999-2006

	1999 est.	2000 est.	2001 est.	2002 est.	2004 est.	2005 est.	2006 est.
GINI index	NA	NA	34.1	26.4	26.4	26.4	29.2
Household income by percentage share, lowest 10%	3.3%	3.4%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	4.5%	3.4%
Household income by percentage share, highest 10%	24.7%	22.5%	22.8%	22.8%	22.8%	22.8%	23.9%
Population below poverty line	NA	35%	35%	12.6%	13.4%	13.4%	4%

Table 29. GINI coefficients 1989-2003

Year	1989	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003
GINI coefficient	0.217	0.228	0.310	0.317	0.342	0.327

Chart 3: GDP Growth and Income Inequality [Hong 2003:3]



Sources: World Bank. World Development Indicator, 2002.

The education level remained relatively stable even if higher education came to be paid (government took the care to keep the university fees relatively accessible):

Table 30: Education indicators 1997-2006

		1990	1995	2000	2004
Gross enrollment ratio (%)	Primary level	97.6	96.8	105.2	104.8
	Secondary level	75.2	78.0	91.4	102.1
	Tertiary level	31.7	39.4	44.5	41.1
Student flow – primary level	Primary completion rate (%)	101.9	86.6	98.0	98.2
	Pupils reaching grade 5 (% of the cohort)	90.6	93.0	–	–
	Repetition rate (%)	4.4	3.5	3.1	2.3
Student flow – secondary level	Progression to secondary level (%)	63.0	94.0	97.3	95.7
	Repetition rate (%)	0.5	2.3	2.1	1.7
Total spending on education as % of GDP		5.2	3.8	3.5	4.2
Ratio of pupils to teachers at primary level		15.4	17.0	16.8	16.7
Gender parity index		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 31: Synthetic index of cultural participation (social groups differentiated according to their social-economic situation) [Tilkidzhiev 2002: 394]

Social groups	Bulgaria	Hungary	Poland
High-level state officials / administrator / managers	192	195	188
Professionals, non-top administrators and managers, experts	155	185	174
Routine non-manual employees	131	124	127
Small and medium size entrepreneurs with employees	163	161	143
Small and medium size entrepreneurs without employees	117	111	117
Technicians	146	123	105
Skilled manual workers	95	76	74
Non-skilled manual workers	70	60	61
Agricultural workers	26	28	35
Farmers	26	57	40
Average	100	100	100

Table 32: Bulgaria, Basic Education Indicators

	2001	2002	2003	2004
Primary Completion Rate, total (% of relevant age group)	102	96	97	98
School enrollment, primary (% net)	96	94	94	95
School enrollment, secondary (% net)	84	87	88	88
School enrollment, tertiary (% net)	42	40	41	41

The health and social security systems have been reformed and became semi-autonomous (managed by government-appointed board, funded by special taxes). The health system reforms are generally believed to have been detrimental to the quality of health services, yet there was not any significant change in morbidity or epidemic rates (save the 2006 hepatitis epidemic in several Roma suburbs).

Table 33: Demography and health indicators 1997-2006

	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006
Population (million)	8.283	8.191	7.891	7.801	7.385
Growth (per 1000)	-6.4	-5.1	-5.8	-5.2	-8.6
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	14.4	13.3	13.3	11.6	19.85
Life expectancy at birth, men	67.1	68.2	68.5	68.9	68.68
Life expectancy at birth, women	74.3	75.3	75.4	76.0	76.13
Physicians per 1000 people	–	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.6
HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%	<0.1%
Net migration rate / 1000 population	–	-5.06	-4.74	-4.58	-4.3

Table 34. Population Age Structure, %, 1999-2005

Age groups	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
0-14 years	16	16	15.11	14.6	14.2	14.4	14.1
15-64 years	68	68	68.17	68.5	68.8	68.5	68.7
65 years	16	16	16.72	16.9	17	17.1	17.2

Chart 4: Physicians per 1000 population, Bulgaria, selected countries, CEE and EU averages





Chart 5: Number of beds in all hospitals per 1000 population in Bulgaria, selected countries, CEE and EU averages



1.5. The Post-Communist: General Conclusions

The post-1989 transformation pauperised the middle class developed in the socialist period and brought about increasing polarization of income and wealth. It divided the Bulgarian population into income losers and income winners (the aged people, families with children, ethnic minorities and unemployed generally identified as income losers, and political and economic elites as income winners [Verwiebe, Wegener 2000]).

The transformation produced significant regional inequalities between the cities and the town and rural areas. Unemployment emerged as one of the most important problems, and though the last 5 years witnessed a positive development in that respect in the cities, the agricultural areas are still suffering a significant share of long-term unemployment.

Another important feature of the post-socialist transformation is that it triggered a significant reduction of the access to social and health care services, as well as a significant increase of the cost of education and health care, which in effect led to social exclusion of the income losing groups (pensioners, unemployed, families with children, ethnic minorities).

The general crisis led in turn to negative demographic trends, and notwithstanding the signs of economic recovery, the Bulgarian society is still to pay the demographic price of the transformation.

SECTION 2. CAUSES AND CORRELATES OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY

There is no explicit theory on the causes of social inequality in Bulgaria. Accounts of social inequality typically explain it by professional stratification, education, gender, or ethnicity.

Professional stratification however can hardly explain income inequalities (cf. table 20): pretty different industries offer similar income opportunities; the power industry employees for example are better paid not because they are more qualified than the health care system employees, but because energy business is much more lucrative; there are however certain professions that could be singled out as distinctively rewarding for the qualification – the banking and financial services, information technologies, highest-level state officials and business executives.

Class is of course a useful concept, yet one should be very careful in applying it to post-communist Bulgarian society.

Of course, one could easily identify some theoretical classes, but the meaning of the identification would be often ambiguous. For example, theoretical considerations made several sociologists to conclude that a middle class comprising 24-29% of the population emerged in the late 1990-ties, yet if asked to indicate their position in the social stratification on 1 to 10 scale (1 = worse off, 10 = better off), 96% of the respondents locate themselves below 5:

Table 35: There are people in our society that are better off, worse off, or in the middle. Where would you locate yourself? [Tilkidzhiev 2002]

	1993	1997
10 better off	–	–
9	–	0.1%
8	0.9%	1.5%
7	2.8%	3.4%
6	15.2%	13.4%
5	14.7%	15.8
4	18.1%	18.1%
3	18.0%	18.0%
2	14.5%	14.5%
1 worse off	11.0%	12.0%

Table 36. Trends in self-identification of Bulgarians measured on Tom Smith's scale [Tilkidzhiev 2002: 298]

		1993	1994	1995	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002
rich	1	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1
	2	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
	3	1	2.2	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.7	0.8	1.2
	4	3	2.6	2.1	3.2	4.2	3.4	3.8	2.2
	5	15.9	11.2	13.6	13.5	11.3	8.9	12.4	9.1
	6	15.4	15.9	19.4	15.3	10.3	11.3	7.9	8.6
	7	19	15.2	20.7	18	16	15.5	17.9	14.7
	8	18.9	15.4	19.2	18.7	18.1	22.5	26	18.8
	9	15.2	13.1	12.2	14.5	20.7	14.9	16.9	16.0
poor	10	11.6	15.2	10.8	12.1	17.5	21.2	13.7	27.3

Almost the half respondents seem to imagine Bulgarian society as a society with a small elite and middle class and huge lower class:

Table 37: In what type of society we are living?

- Type A: Small elite on the top, not many people in the middle, many people at the bottom
- Type B: A pyramid with small elite, more people in the middle and most at the bottom
- Type C: A pyramid except for a small number of people at the bottom
- Type D: Most people in the middle
- Type E: Many people close to the top, small group at the bottom

[Tilkidzhiev 1988: 129]

	Today		Before 30 years		After 30 years		Ought to be	
	Bulgaria	Poland	Bulgaria	Poland	Bulgaria	Poland	Bulgaria	Poland
Type A	49.2	50.2	10.5	18.7	9.7	13.4	0.7	2.4
Type B	20.1	18.5	19.5	24.4	10.5	9.9	1.1	8.3
Type C	5.5	6.1	15.9	11.6	11.5	8.7	3.5	5.9
Type D	7.7	7.6	27.0	15.5	21.3	17.4	38.0	38.0
Type E	1.2	3.4	2.9	4.8	12.0	9.1	39.4	28.1
Don't know	16.2	14.2	24.2	25.0	35.0	41.5	17.3	17.3
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Another defect of class accounts of contemporary Bulgarian society stems from the fact that classes seem to imply some level of class consciousness, which is virtually lacking in post-communist Bulgarian society. For example respondents seem


more inclined to describe social conflicts in terms of rich and poor rather than in terms of classes or working relations:

Table 38: How strong are the conflicts between the following groups? [Tilkidzhiev 1988: 134]

Conflicts	Severe	Moderate	None
Rich vs. poor (%)	47.1	21.8	15.9
Employers vs. employees (%)	44.6	27.0	12.9
Young vs. old (%)	32.6	32.9	20.3
Unemployed vs. employed (%)	29.8	28.7	25.3
Rural vs. urban population (%)	17.2	25.4	40.7
Working vs. middle class (%)	13.7	31.9	35.5

Gender seems useful inequality predictor in the context of political rather than economic or educational inequality. The GDI to HDI ratio is currently 98%, and have not gone significant changes since the first half of the 1990-ties.

Chart 6: Income structure, 2004



The literacy level is practically gender independent (99% literate men, 98% literate women). Before 2005 the unemployment rates were higher for men rather than for women (cf. table 20). Only a negligible percentage of the women declare themselves to be housewives (less than 1% in 2002). Yet there are significantly fewer women on important political positions.

Chart 7: Mayors, gender structure after 1999 and 2003 elections [Stoilova 2004: 1998]






Chart 8: Seats in parliament held by women




Year	1990	1997	2000	2004
Seats in Parliament held by Women, %	21.0	13.3	10.8	26.3

Chart 9: Female share of non-agricultural wage employment, %



Year	1990	1995	2000	2002
Female share of non-agricultural wage employment, %	54.2	53.0	52.8	51.3

Chart 10: Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education



Year	1990	1995	2000	2002
Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education (number of girls per boy)	1.1	1.53	1.35	1.23

Education is useful predictor in the context of employment. Yet there are professions with high levels of educational and cultural capital, and extremely low income levels, including the university professors and academic researchers (between 1992 and 1995, more than 20% of the academic staff has been laid off; in 2006 an

average university professor salary was 270E per month). The importance of education has been further weakened by the significant rates of unemployed university graduates in the early 1990-ties and the continually growing levels of university enrolment (cf. table 25).

Ethnicity is an important factor of inequality. In the late 1990-ties, due to the decreasing education and employment rates, Roma minority emerged as an underclass.

Chart 11: Ethnic groups, 2006




Table 39. Population Ethnic Structure, %, 1999-2005

Ethnic Groups	1998	2001
Bulgarian	83	83.9
Turk	8.5	9.4
Roma	2.6	4.7
Other	5.9	2

Table 40. Population Confessional Structure, %, 1999-2005

Confessional Groups	1998	2000
Orthodox	83.5	82.6
Muslim	13	12.2
Catholic	1.7	1.7
Jewish	0.8	0.1
Other	1	3.4

Table 41: Absolute poverty in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, national and Roma sample (%) [Mitev 2002: 39]

Country	Sample	1. Food (-)	2. Clothing (-)	3. TV (-)	4. Car (-)	5. All (+)
Bulgaria	National	26	54	17	3	0.3
	Ethnic	72	25	3	0.4	–
Hungary	National	4	33	40	22	2
	Ethnic	20	49	25	6	0.2
Romania	National	22	50	21	6	1
	Ethnic	60	33	5	2	0.5

Table 42: Education / employment, national and Roma sample (%) [Mitev 2002: 41]

Country	Education	Sample	Employed	Unemployed	Pensioner
Bulgaria	< elementary	national	3.5	14.6	77.1
	< elementary	ethnic	9.8	56.2	27.7
	elementary	national	13.5	26.9	54.6
	elementary	ethnic	18.0	62.0	9.8
Hungary	< elementary	national	1.9	–	92.5
	< elementary	ethnic	1.0	20.4	45.4
	elementary	national	41.3	8.4	38.7
	elementary	ethnic	33.2	26.0	16.4

The main factors of ethnic inequality were the ghettoization of the Roma districts, the increasing rates of Roma children dropping out school, and the high rates of unemployment; being generally unqualified, in the communist period Roma worked mainly in heavy industries, which collapsed in the early 1990-ties, causing an explosion of the unskilled workers unemployment rates (47.5% of the total unemployment in 2006).

Another important factor of inequality is age. The reforms doomed to destitution the aged population, which principal income was the pension (in 2006, an average pension amounted to 50-60 EUR per month, and the maximal pension amounted to 100 EUR).

Table 43: Absolute poverty in relation to age (%) [Mitev 2002: 37]

Country	Age	1. Food (-)	2. Clothing (-)	3. TV (-)	4. Car (-)	5. All (+)	I. (1+2)	II. (3)	III. (4+5)
Bulgaria	60+	30	57	12	1	–	87	12	1
	30-59	24	55	18	4	–	79	18	4
	< 30	27	45	24	3		72	24	3
Romania	60+	27	54	15	4		81	15	4
	30-59	22	50	21	7	1	72	21	8
	<30	15	41	35	7	2	56	35	9
Hungary	60+	3	41	44	12	1	44	44	13
	30-59	5	31	38	24	2	36	38	26
	< 30	3	23	38	33	3	26	38	36

More importantly, the popular opinion is often inclined to attribute significant weight to factors of inequality, which sociologists tend to call ideological. For example, when asked to choose between factors relevant to social mobility, respondents attributed significant weight to occupation, but also to the political capital and the legitimate or illegitimate access to power (cf. Table 15).

SECTION 3. SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE

Inequality is rarely a topic in contemporary Bulgarian public discourse. Although media often speak of development, poverty, corruption, wealth, equality is generally associated with communism, and so, if trying to make political claims, one would rather avoid language of inequality in order to escape that association.

The public accounts of inequality are generally molded on some common sense version of the functionalist theories. In view of their tendency to take the provision of equal opportunities for granted, those accounts are hardly able to address the real situation.

The political aspects of inequality have been approached by several studies, which detected a rift between the official discourse on inequality and the popular claims:

Table 44: Social inequality is justified if it shows the unequal abilities of the people (% from ‘strongly agree’) [Tilkidzhiev 2004: 86]

	Bulgaria	Romania	Hungary
Professionals	19.7	31.3	14.8
Officials, high school education	17.7	30.4	12.1
Skilled workers	19.5	26.6	13.2
Unskilled workers	12.9	19.2	1.5
Farmers	4.5	6.5	3.3
Base	893	835	883
Cramer V	0.156	0.139	0.129

The sociologists shared the general belief that Bulgarians are to be educated in democracy, and identified democracy with functionalist theories of inequality, which led them to explain the popular resistance to functionalist tenets as a symptom of post-communist nostalgia, inability to adapt to the new reality, or even rejection of democracy.

That explanation was further stimulated by the widespread discontent with post-communist government, interpreted as well in terms of nostalgia:

Table 45: Democracy is always a good idea (% from ‘strongly agree’) [Tilkidzhiev 2004: 90]

	Bulgaria	Romania	Hungary
Professionals	27.0	64.1	38.7
Officials, high school education	21.0	43.9	27.6
Skilled workers	24.8	34.6	21.4
Unskilled workers	13.6	24.4	12.1
Farmers	12.7	16.1	26.7

Table 46: Socialism is always a good idea (% from ‘strongly agree’) [Tilkidzhiev 2004: 91]

	Bulgaria	Romania	Hungary
Professionals	16.4	1.6	9.9
Officials, high school education	9.9	4.7	10.9
Skilled workers	14.2	9.2	15.5
Unskilled workers	27.2	11.5	27.3
Farmers	22.7	12.9	13.3

Table 47: Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was? 1 means very bad and 10 means very good [Halman 2001: 205]

	Mean	Std. deviation	N
Bulgaria	4.79	2.99	891
Romania	4.56	3.06	1059
Hungary	5.48	2.26	909
Total	5.16	2.4	35611

Recent study however suggested a different explanation of the phenomenon: inequality is a political issue, and functionalist social surveys tend to overlook its political nature; respondents read allegedly innocent functionalist questions as ‘social inequality is justified if it shows the unequal abilities of the people’ as normative statements about particular social realities (e.g. ‘social inequality *in contemporary Bulgaria* is justified *for* it shows the unequal abilities of the people’); since respondents find such normative statements inadequate, they often reject them not because they believe that unequal abilities should be disregarded but rather because they believe that social inequality in contemporary Bulgaria does not “show” the unequal abilities.

In a word, functionalist statements on inequality are often perceived as statements that things are the way they ought to be, thus spurring anyone believing otherwise to contradict them, frequently in order to call for more rather than less democracy (democracy is in fact quite popular in Bulgaria).

Table 48: I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country: Having a democracy political system? [Halman 2001: 209]

	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad	N
Bulgaria	45.2	41.2	10.4	3.2	778
Romania	39.2	49.5	7.4	3.9	965
Hungary	35.7	51.4	9.7	3.2	899
Total	46.3	43.8	7.5	2.4	355589

Table 49: I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system: Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form of government. [Halman 2001: 209]

	Agree strongly	Agree	Agree nor disagree	Disagree	N
Bulgaria	43.3	40.3	12.8	3.6	804
Romania	33.9	44.3	14.9	6.9	973
Hungary	26.3	54.9	15.6	3.1	1209
Total	42.8	47.2	8.1	1.9	35854

Table 50: How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in your country)? [Halman 2001: 214]

	A lot of respect	Some respect	Not much respect	No respect	N
Bulgaria	4.0	30.2	45.8	20.0	924
Romania	3.8	199	56.9	19.5	1032
Hungary	74	49.7	32.0	10.8	958
Total	13.0	46.1	31.0	9.8	38396

This explanation is further strengthened by the fact that Bulgarian respondents insist on equality policies relatively less often than the respondents from other post-communist countries:

Table 51: Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?

- I find that both freedom and equality are important. But I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important.
- Certainly, both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, nobody underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong [Halman 2001: 159]

	A	B	neither	N
Bulgaria	60.1	35.1	4.8	909
Romania	60.3	39.7	—	1051
Hungary	44.7	47.9	7.4	932
Total	52.9	40.7	6.4	37158

Table 52: How would you place your views on this scale? (1 -5 = incomes should be made more equal, 7-10 = there should be greater incentives for individual effort [Halman 2001: 165]

	Mean	Std. deviation	N
Bulgaria	6.12	3.05	951
Romania	3.69	3.04	1055
Poland	6.09	3.16	1079
Total	5.66	2.98	27201

The most salient expression of inequality is the display of wealth. There are of course different practical methods of displaying wealth that hardly need to be summarized here (popular imagination have associated wealth with expensive car, villa in Spain, vacation abroad etc.)

An important feature of the contemporary Bulgarian society however is the negative attitude about wealth. Even though several sociologists interpreted that negative attitude as a kind of envy, it can also be shown to be politically motivated as most Bulgarians believe that privatization was unfair, and the current economic elite was its consequence.

Some relatively neglected aspects of inequality are traveling opportunities and access to administrative services (since administrative procedures are complicated, time-consuming and relatively expensive, individuals often do not command adequate resources to claim or enforce their rights). There is no stable language of inequality, and class languages are as yet unstudied.

Public opinion generally perceives inequality in the contemporary Bulgarian society as enormous and unjustifiable. [Hristov 2007] The causes of inequality are believed to be the employment, as usual, and – a feature more specific to Bulgaria – the unequal distribution of political capital leading to unequal access to state resources. The access to state resources is believed to have been particularly crucial in the 1990-ties because it has offered an enormous advantage in privatization (27.8% of the privatized firms and industries were bought by the so-called worker-management cooperatives, i.e. by the government appointed managers).

SECTION 4. SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND THE NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEM

The relationships between social inequality and the party system are as yet understudied.

Inequality issues are not particularly salient in political competition. One could distinguish however three general political positions on inequality – the neoliberal, socialist, and dissident positions.

The neoliberal position can be roughly summarized like this: inequality is normal, it reflects the unequal natural assets, merits, talents, accomplishments etc. of the individuals, and is vital to society for the reason that it stimulates competition and spurs the members to do theirs level best; inequality is essential to democracy and market economy and justified if emerging against a background of equal opportunities; equality is a communist ideal or at least ideology, because it implies redistribution, which in turn implies state intervention, but state intervention is unacceptable in a market economy. In a word, neoliberal position consists in a kind of common sense version of the functionalist theory of social inequalities.

The first to adopt the neoliberal tenets was the United Democratic Forces (UDF), the major opposition alliance that emerged after 1989. UDF spokesmen though tried not to emphasize their neoliberal beliefs since social surveys in the early 1990-ties had almost universally reached the conclusion that equality was an

extremely popular idea, which was quite unwise to question. What was more, the practical details of the policy recommended by the UDF contradicted the notion of market distribution in view of the fact that privatization was feasible only by means of redistribution through state intervention.

The party system of the 1990-ties was relatively stable. There were two major political actors: UDF legitimating themselves as anticommunists, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP legitimating itself as an heir of the former communist party (that is relying on the famous post-communist nostalgia). There was also the allegedly ethnic party Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF depending on the Turkish constituency, and endorsing in theory the neoliberal doctrine, without giving too much weight to any general political programs. A host of smaller neoliberal parties, most notably the Bulgarian Agrarian Popular Union, BAPU of Anastasia Moser and the Radical Democracy Party, RDP, gravitated towards UDF and were only nominally independent. The first populist party, the Bulgarian Business Bloc, BBB, formed in the mid-1990-ties under the lead of the colorful figure of George Ganchev, oddly enough was the most vociferous supporter of the neoliberal position.

The political field was destabilized by the growing discontent with the UDF government and the appearance of another neoliberal party, the National Movement Simeon the Second, NMS2, which won a sweeping victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections. NMS2 tried to present itself as the party of the successful young professionals, so the party spokesmen talked a lot about stimulating the competition, respecting the talent, rewarding the ability etc. it shied however at the awkward issues of inequality calling instead for national unity in the name of the higher goals (development, EU and NATO accession).

The emergence of NMS2 dealt a crushing blow on UDF, which eventually split into smaller parties, most important of which is the Party for Strong Bulgaria of the former UDF prime-minister Ivan Kostov. In the mid-2000-ties all the neoliberal parties, much to their mutual disappointment, became members of the European Popular Party.

In 2005, after 4 years in office, NMS2 turned rather unpopular and lost the elections. As it seems now, the party has almost completely lost its political potential. In fact, all the old neoliberal parties are so weak that it is uncertain if they will make it into the next parliament (except for MRF; in the 2005 parliamentary elections NMS2 won 19.9% of the vote, MRF – 12.7%, UDF – 7.7%, DSB – 6.5%). In the late 2006

the mayor of Sofia Boyko Borisov, earlier an important figure in NMS2, formed new party, CEDB that sociologists believe to have a bright future. Trying to stay close to the older neoliberal parties, Borisov however have not made any statement on his social inequality policies.

The socialist position can be generally summarized in the following way: socially disadvantaged groups need state care and therefore redistribution carried out by the state. That position is perfectly compatible with the neoliberal doctrines as disadvantaged groups obviously do not have access to the equal opportunities enjoyed by the rest of society, and therefore state intervention in favor of those groups is perfectly justifiable in neoliberal terms.

The major proponent of the socialist position is the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (the heir of the former Bulgarian Communist Party, BCP). Trying to dissociate itself from BCP, in the first half of the 1990-ties BSP avoided the language of equality and obviously was unable to legitimate itself by claiming the justifiability of inequality. After leaving office in 1997, BSP became the main opposition party and tried to criticize the neoliberal policies of the UDF government by appealing for social policies, without recourse however to the language of inequality (BSP spokesmen preferred instead to talk about social suffering).

In fact the most prominent proponent of the socialist position was the BSP leader Georgy Parvanov, who won the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections precisely by insisting on the need for social policies and compassion to the disadvantaged groups. After the 2005 parliamentary election victory (31.1% of the vote), BSP formed a coalition government together with NMS2 and MRF and, as it seems, managed to combine the socialist position with unwaveringly neoliberal policy. BSP is a member of the European Socialist Party.

The dissident position consists in claiming that privatization has been unfair, and so the current elite are illegitimate. The position is dissident only in the sense that the other political actors refuse to recognize it as a legitimate position and do whatever they can to eliminate it. The main proponent of this position is the political party ATAKA, formed by Volen Siderov.

ATAKA caused significant turmoil in the last parliamentary elections, where it surprisingly won 8.2%, and in 2006 presidential elections Siderov made it to the second tour (which he lost out with 22.7% against 77.3% of the vote for Parvanov). The political commentators often describe ATAKA as a populist party, though it

would be perhaps more appropriate to call it nationalist (Siderov makes the impression of being quite knowledgeable about the theory of nationalism and quite willing to exploit that theory to his advantage).

Table 53. Parliamentary Elections Results, %

Political Parties	Self-declared political identification	1997	2001	2005
Bulgarian Socialist Party	Left	22	17.15	31.1
United Democratic Forces	Right	52	18.18	7.7
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Center ²	7	7.45	12.7
Euro-Left	Left	5.5	–	–
Bulgarian Business Bloc	Center	4.95	–	–
National Movement Simeon 2	Center	–	42.74	19.9
ATAACK	Nationalist	–	–	8.2
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria ³	Right	–	–	6.5
Bulgarian Popular Union ⁴	Right	–	–	5.2

SECTION 5. MECHANISMS FOR AMELIORATION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY

The Bulgarian economy is to a significant extent state-centred (in 2006 the government redistributed 47.7% of the GDP, in 22.3% of the GDP was appropriated through taxes). In view of the rates of state redistribution, the government welfare policies seem rather feeble: in 2005, only 8.1% of central government expenditure was allocated to welfare, between 1994 and 2004 the average expenditure allocated to health was 6%, and to education – 5%. Thus reduction of social inequality is not amongst the prominent objectives of the government neither in words nor in deed.

The income tax is relatively, though not absolutely flat (20% for annual income between 1104 EUR and 1840 EUR, 22% for annual income up to 3681 EUR, and 24% for annual income above 3681 EUR). The tax policies of the government are aimed at stimulating the economic growth, and therefore on reducing corporate taxes (the profit tax has been consistently decreased from 23.5% in 2003 to 10% in 2006). In fact, in 2005 more than 60% of the budget revenues came from taxes, which burden fell directly or indirectly on the general public rather than on the business.

² Since its establishment in 1990 MRF has been relying exclusively on ethnic, predominantly Turk constituency.

³ The party was established by the former UDF prime-minister Ivan Kostov after his 2001 breaking up from UDF.

⁴ The union was formed by parties that left UDF in 2001.

Table 54: Government Income, source Republican Budget Law 2003-2007, ml. lv.

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
Tax Revenue	Profit tax	872.6	850.4	915.4	978.4	1319.8
	Taxes on dividends and incomes of foreign and local juridical entities	47.6	61.0	60.7	72.7	90.7
	Income tax	375.2	1108.8	1216.6	1040.0	1446.05
	VAT	2943.1	3336.4	4235.0	5509.5	6301.00
	Excises	1501.3	1747.0	1946.8	2582.2	3172.7
	Custom duties	180.1	204.3	240.1	357.7	240.2
	Other	146.8	152.9	164.3	195.6	146.1
	Nontax revenues	1565.7	1565.2	1626.1	1546.3	1576.2
Grants	1.565	1.5	2.3	6.6	248.7	
Total	7660.3	9052.5	10432.2	12289.0	14541.5	

Table 55: Government Expenditure, source Republican Budget Law 2003-2007, ml. lv.

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Wages and Salaries	590.1	692.4	766.2	1608.8	1827.6
Social and Health Insurance contributions	210.6	253.1	273.3	540.9	611.2
Maintenance	2408.5	2506.2	2830.2	2128.5	2256.0
Interests	838.6	786.2	791.1	659.5	727.5
Social expenditure, scholarships	732.0	797.1	843.0	900.9	889.8
Subsidies	522.4	506.7	549.6	379.9	416.6
Capital expenditure and state reserve gain	547.3	693.4	833.1	1245.9	1824.0
Contingency	72.3	87.5	274.0	168.5	131.4
Total expenditure and transfers	8021.6	9289.5	10467.2	11901.1	13772.6

Table 56: Government social expenditure

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Government social expenditure, % of total government expenditure and transfers	9.1	8.6	7.3	7.6	6.5

The government tax policy however was to an extent unpopular in view of the huge public support for progressive taxation (the 1999 support for example was higher than in any European country):

Table 57: Support for progressive taxation, 1999 [Luebker 2004: 46]

People with high income should pay as tax	A larger or a much larger share of their income	A smaller or much smaller share of their income	Mean
Bulgaria	92.7	1.3	1.44
Hungary	84.0	1.9	1.88
United States	65.0	2.3	2.16


Another important feature of the government tax policy is the tendency of reducing the direct taxation and raising indirect taxation, and therefore of further undermining the popular progressive taxation policies inherited from the socialist period (both VAT and excises were introduced after the collapse of the socialist regime).

The government social expenditure was focused mainly at providing for the necessary funds allowing the governmental agencies to pay the pensions, and unemployment assistance grants.

Although the government attempted to establish an unemployment compensation network already in the beginning of the 1990-ties, the programs turned out rather ineffective – they covered only 52% of the unemployed in 1991, 37% in 1994 and about 35% according to the current trade union estimates, while the compensation period and amount was cut more than in half. [Verwiebe, Wegner 2000]

Governmental expenditure on education and culture was focused at maintaining the existing education structure (the bulk of the expenditure consisted in paying salaries to the state employed teachers and professors).

Chart 12: Central government expenditure on education



Year	1980	1985	1990	1995
Central government expenditure on education, % of GDP	4.51	5.49	5.64	3.95

Table 58: Public cultural expenditure: by level of government, in '000 BGL

Level of government	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004
Central	49817.2 (65.11%)	72810.1 (47.96%)	113838.3 (63.68%)	99300 (50.7%)	120114 (56.9%)	172136 (74.76%)	181712 (79.47%)
Regional	8.9 (0.01%)	7.2 (0.005%)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Municipal / local	26691.8 (34.88%)	49935.8% (32.98%)	58041 (32.47%)	51600 (26.3%)	NA	53000 (25.33%)	46947 (20.53%)
Extra budgetary allocation	NA	29051.3 (19.14%)	6891.1 (3.85%)	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	76517.9	151804.4	178770.8	196300	211100	225136	228659

The government health expenditure has been geared at reforming the health system and decreasing the health expenditure itself. That policy succeeded to a significant extent after the establishment of the National Health Insurance Fund in 1998.

Table 59: Public Health Expenditure

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Per capita total expenditure on health at international dollar rate (\$)	342	381	476	561	573
Per capita government expenditure on health at international dollar rate (\$)	223	226	267	317	312

Perhaps the most successful policy bearing on inequality is the employment policy of the last 2 governments that tried to reduce unemployment by providing temporary unskilled jobs (the unemployed are required for example to clean the streets 2 days in a month which entitles them to 40E welfare payment). This policy is however hardly anything more than a temporary alleviation of the problem.

Both central government and non-governmental organizations however invest significant resources in Roma integration (government integration policies are widely assessed as inefficient). The churches and trade unions have hardly played any role in the amelioration of social inequality.

There are currently 22366 registered and 660 operating NGOs in Bulgaria (169 international ones, 247 focusing on minority and human rights, 256 focusing on social issues, 330 – on education, and 145 – on health care⁵). The Bulgarian NGOs however are generally small organizations working on small and often dormant projects:

Table 60: NGO staff number in the spheres of social care, health care, education, and minority rights

Number of staff	Minority and Human Rights	Social Issues	Health Care	Education
Less than 5	203	197	121	273
5 to 10	23	32	8	30
10 to 20	11	12	10	15
More than 20	10	15	6	12

The large-scale NGOs are usually dependant on international funding:

Table 61: NGOs relying on EU, US, international private funding sources and Bulgarian government funding

Number of staff	Total number	EU	US	Private international donors	Bulgarian government
Less than 5	551	33.4%	22.9%	24.5%	10.7%
5 to 10	60	66.7%	46.7%	40.0%	28.3%
10 to 20	26	65.4%	50.0%	46.2%	38.5%
More than 20	23	65.2%	56.5%	56.5%	34.8%

⁵ NGOs usually declare more than one sphere of activity, so NGOs working in the fields of minority rights, social issues and education are to a large extent the same.

The international funding has been however channelled into local improvements rather than into producing sustainable development, and so the NGOs generally displayed low efficiency in fighting social inequality. [Minev 2002: 4]

Furthermore, NGOs often turned out to be ill-equipped to meet the challenges of larger projects (according to 2002 estimates, the funding of more than 70% of the NGO projects has been terminated).

In order to avoid mismanagement, international donors tend to rely on local networks and limited number of Bulgarian experts, government officials, and NGOs (a 2002 study found out that a small group of 70 Bulgarian experts were involved in almost any internationally funded NGO project since the early 1990-ties funded [Minev 2002: 6]).

Finally, NGOs tend to work with rather than against the government: in 2006 only 7% of the NGOs were involved in monitoring government activities, and 4% - in political pressure groups.

SECTION 6. MAIN PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING KNOWLEDGE

We are virtually lacking data on the relation between inequality and classes, and indeed on the classes composing the contemporary Bulgarian society. The dominant model of Bulgaria social stratification studies have been heavily influenced by John Goldtorpe's stratification theory, and believing that this was the major thrust of Goldtorpe, Bulgarian sociologists tried to replace the notion of class with alternative notions like socio-economic status (cf. [Tilkidzhiev 2002]) Analyzing Bulgarian social stratification in terms of class was further impeded by the general association of class with communism as well as by the widespread disbelief that people sharing common economic situation could also share common interests, culture, or political agenda. (A recent study asked the respondents to describe their economic situation in terms of class and found out that respondents generally claimed that there were only two classes in Bulgaria, the ruling class and the people, apparently reinterpreting the notion of class as a political rather than economic cleavage [Hristov 2006]).

Another shortcoming of the current studies is that they tend to overlook the political dimension of the inequality issues, invited by questions if the things are the way they ought to be, and what actually happened after the end of communism. The mentioned study for example showed that inequality issues seemed relevant only to

respondents that had begun their professional carrier in the socialist period or in the very beginning of the 1990-ties, while the younger respondents tended to gloss it over as a political language that had nothing to do with their everyday life concerns. The respondents interested in inequality however tried to appropriate the questions so as to make them speak the truth of the transformation (e.g. they used the interview questions to claim that transformation was misguided, that it unfairly robbed the people of their wealth and redistributed it to the communist elite etc.). In other words, respondents were interested not in inequality itself but – taking the growing income and wealth gap for obvious – tried to blame or justify the government responsible for that gap. Neglecting that political dimension of inequality, social stratification studies often escalated into attempts at educating rather than understanding the public.

CONCLUSIONS

The desk research showed that social inequality in Bulgaria can hardly be explained without reference to the historical background.

The post-liberation period triggered a thorough transformation of the social structure characterized by pauperization of the agricultural workers and craftsmen, escalating wealth gap, emergence of a political and economic elite inaccessible to the lower social strata, and wide distribution of cultural capital.

The socialist revolution drove the bourgeois elite out and tried to develop a kind of middle class as well as universally accessible social services (education, health care, employment). In fact, as oppressive as it was, the socialist regime was widely perceived by the general public as a version of the western welfare state, particularly after the fall of the regime.

The post-socialist transformation initiated a decline of the state provided social services, and particularly in its earlier phase, before 1997, led the country into deep economic crises with soaring rates of unemployment and inflation. After 1997 the economy has stabilized and to an extent prospered, yet the period witnessed further increase of income and wealth inequality, pauperization of the socialist middle class, emergence of another tightly intertwined economic and political elite, as well as social groups of transformation losers (pensioners, unemployed, families with children, ethnic minorities).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BEROV 1974

БЕРОВ, Л. 1974. *Икономическото развитие на България през вековете*. София: Профиздат

DASKALOV 2005

ДАСКАЛОВ, Р. 2005. *Българското общество 1878-1939*. Т. 1-2. София: Гутенберг

DEMOGRAFSKA 1988

ДЕМОГРАФСКА И СОЦИАЛНОИКОНОМИЧЕСКА ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА НА ИКОНОМИЧЕСКИ АКТИВНОТО НАСЕЛЕНИЕ. Т. 2. София: ЦСУ

DIMITROV 1995

ДИМИТРОВ, Г. *България в орбитите на модернизацията*. София: СУ “св. Климент Охридски”

DIMITROVA 2002

ДИМИТРОВА, Б. *Състояние на обществото: Основни изводи*. София: Отворено общество

HALMAN, L. 2001. *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*. Tilburg: Tilburg University

HONG, S. 2003. Growth and Inequality in Bulgaria: Occupation Choice Model. <http://home.uchicago.edu/~hongs/papers/Hong-leb.pdf>, accessed on 6.05.07

HRISTOV 2007

ХРИСТОВ, Т. 2007. *Социалното легитимиране на държавната власт и селските бунтове от 1900 г.* Извор: София

LUEBKER, M. 2004. *Globalization and Perceptions of Inequality*. International Labor Organization Publications, Geneva

MINEV 2002

МИНЕВ, Д. 2002. Как умира гражданствеността и колко струва нейната смърт. http://dem-pr.hit.bg/2002_2/2002_2_01.html (accessed on 6.05.2007)

МИТЕВ 2002

МИТЕВ, П.-Е. 2002. Динамика на бедността. В: СЕЛЕНИ, И. (съст.) *Бедността при посткомунизма*. Изток-Запад: София

РАИЧЕВ 2000

РАЙЧЕВ, А., КОЛЕВ, А. БУНДЖУЛОВ, Л. ДИМОВА. 2000. *Социалната стратификация в България*. ЛИК: София

STATISTICHSKI GODISHNIK 1992

СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИ ГОДИШНИК. 1992. София: НСИ

STATISTICHSKI SPRAVOCHNIK 1997

СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИ СПРАВОЧНИК. 1997. София: НСИ

STOILOVA 2004

СТОИЛОВА, Р. 2004. Индивидуализирани неравенства. *Социологически проблеми* 1-2: 183-200

STOILOVA 2001

СТОИЛОВА, Р. 2001. *Неравенства и общностна интеграция*. ЛИК: София

TILKIDZHIEV 2004

ТИЛКИДЖИЕВ, Н. 2004. Новите посткомунистически йерархии: “блоковото” разделяне и статусният ред. *Социологически проблеми* 1-2: 76-98

TILKIDZHIEV 2002

ТИЛКИДЖИЕВ, Н. 2002. *Средна класа и социална стратификация*. ЛИК: София

TILKIDZIEV 1988

ТИЛКИДЖИЕВ, Н., С. КОЛЕВА, Ц. ЗЛАТКОВ, М. КЕЛИЯН, Д. КОСТОВА. *Социална стратификация и неравенство*. София: М-8-М

TOTEV 1974

ТОТЕВ, А. 1974. Демографско-исторически очерк на България. *ГСУ: Юридически факултет* 65: 143-225

VERWIEBE, R., WEGENER, B. 2000. Social Inequality and Perceived Income Justice Gap. *Social Justice Research* 13:2

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/countryData>

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bulgaria_statistics.html

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/SummaryEducationProfiles>

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/countryData/>

<http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=profile&>

<https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/bu.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/BudgetHome/BudgetHome05.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/BudgetHome/AveragePrices05.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/SocialActivities/Lekari05.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/SESData02.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila3q06.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila2005.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila2004.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila1203.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila1202.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila1201.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila1200.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/RabSila1199.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/LCS05.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/LCS04.htm>

<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/LCS03.htm>
<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/LCS02.htm>
<http://www.nsi.bg/Labour/LCS01.htm>
http://www.nsi.bg/public_e/New-Private2004.htm
<http://catalogue.ngorc.icb.bg/eng/search.asp>
(accessed on 6.05.2007)